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EXPANDING THE SEARCH FOR AMERICA’S
MISSING JURY
Richard Lorren Jolly*
The Missing American Jury: Restoring the Fundamental
Constitutional Role of the Criminal, Civil, and Grand Ju-
ries. By Suja A. Thomas. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2016. Pp. ix, 251. Cloth, $99.99; paper, $34.99.
Introduction
It may come as a surprise to more than a few readers to learn that 
America’s juries are disappearing. Whether it is the murder of Caylee 
Anthony, the libel of Hulk Hogan, or the shooting of Michael Brown, me-
dia outlets dedicate extensive coverage to criminal, civil, and grand juries 
alike.1 But reports of the jury’s life are greatly exaggerated. Juries today de-
termine fewer cases than at any other point in the nation’s history. For in-
stance, in 1962, the year when most judicial statistics become available, 
federal juries decided 8.2% of criminal cases and 5.5% of civil cases.2 Yet by 
2015, these numbers dwindled to just 2.04% of criminal cases3 and a paltry 
0.76% of civil cases.4 Every state court across the country has seen a com-
mensurate decline.5
* Research Fellow for the Civil Jury Project, New York University School of Law.
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1. See Lizette Alvarez, Casey Anthony Not Guilty in Slaying of Daughter, N.Y. Times
(July 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/06/us/06casey.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review); Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police Officer Is Not
Indicted, N.Y. Times (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-dar
ren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review);
Nick Madigan & Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against
Gawker, N.Y. Times (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/
gawker-hulk-hogan-verdict.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
2. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 462 tbl.1, 554 tbl.A-17 (2004).
3. U.S. District Courts—Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Type of Disposition and
Offense, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2015, U.S. Cts., http://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/D04Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZMV8-
9ZYQ].
4. P. 2; U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken,
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2015, U.S. Cts., http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/data_tables/C04Sep15.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9EU-RW3N].
5. See Galanter, supra note 2, at 510; see also Carol J. DeFrances et al., Nat’l Ctr.
For State Courts, 1992: Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties 1 (1995),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/cjcavilc.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS8L-5GL5] (demonstrating that,
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This decline is alarming. Juries allow lay citizens to check judges’ work
for corruption, state aggrandizement, and application of grounded norma-
tive standards.6 They have thus been described as the “lower judicial bench”
in a bicameral judiciary7 and as “the democratic branch of the judiciary
power.”8 Moreover, jury service offers one of the few opportunities for citi-
zens to be directly involved in the administration of law. As Alexis de 
Tocqueville described, it is “a free school” that “instill[s] some of the habits
of the judicial mind into every citizen.”9 Perhaps unsurprisingly then, trial
by jury is the only right to appear by name in all three of the nation’s found-
ing documents: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the
Bill of Rights. The disappearance of America’s juries should thus give us
pause and command our scrutiny.
Many authors have attempted to explain the jury’s decline. Some focus
on the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, which, coupled with advancements in evidence preservation,
have rendered the truth-finding role of jury trials mostly redundant.10
Others emphasize the costs and unpredictability of jury trials, observing that
the resources and risks attendant to jury trial make it an inefficient form of
dispute resolution.11 Finally, some point to the rise of managerial judges
who view their role as to guide parties toward settlement rather than to
preside over jury trials.12
Professor Suja Thomas13 offers a novel approach in her new book, The
Missing American Jury: Restoring the Fundamental Constitutional Role of the
Criminal, Civil, and Grand Juries. She begins by recognizing the jury as a
constitutionally mandated institution possessing specific powers and limita-
tions in relation to the executive, legislature, and judiciary. She then explains
how these traditional government actors have gradually usurped the jury’s
unique powers for themselves and so diminished the jury’s constitutional
import. Juries are vanishing, then, because the other actors have emerged in
because only 2% of state cases in 1992 went to jury trial, state jury decline has tracked federal
jury decline).
6. See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 214,
249–50 (Herbet J. Storing ed., 1981).
7. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 95
(1998) (referencing John Taylor, An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the
Government of the United States 209 (W. Stark ed., 1950) (1814)).
8. See Essays by a Farmer No. IV, in 5 The Complete Anti-Federalist, supra note 6, at
36, 38.
9. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 274 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Law-
rence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1835).
10. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
Yale L.J. 522, 569–72 (2012).
11. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a
System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 62 (1996).
12. See, e.g., Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges, 65 Am. U. L.
Rev. 353, 355 (2015).
13. Peer and Sarah Pederson Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law.
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their stead. As a solution, she proposes recognizing the jury as a “branch”—
a coequal to and a significant check on the traditional branches (p. 5)—and
offers a doctrinal approach she calls “relational originalism” to assure this
position (p. 8).
While The Missing American Jury provides an encompassing look at the
jury’s decline, it is not complete. In the introduction, Professor Thomas ex-
plains her decision to omit arbitration and settlement from the discussion,
choosing instead to focus only on “procedures imposed by the government
to which parties do not consent or procedures such as plea bargaining to
which a party may unwillingly consent” (p. 3). This omission is a rare mis-
step. The emergence of binding arbitration and private ordering of public
adjudication has tracked and contributed to the decline in the civil jury’s
constitutional esteem. The legislature and the judiciary have removed power
from the jury and vested it in private parties’ hands. In so doing, they have
allowed powerful social and economic actors to sideline the civil jury and
have shielded their own behavior from public scrutiny. These developments
in private civil procedure are a necessary part of the discussion.
This Review incorporates private procedure into Professor Thomas’s ex-
planation for the jury’s disappearance. Part I analyzes Professor Thomas’s
central premise that the jury has fallen in constitutional esteem due to power
grabs by the traditional actors. It also considers her proposal to fill the doc-
trinal void that has allowed this decline. Part II provides a historical over-
view of the emergence of private procedure and stresses that this
development mirrors those power grabs reviewed in the book. Finally, Part
III applies Professor Thomas’s relational originalism doctrinal approach to
private procedure.
I. The Missing American Jury
This Review considers Professor Thomas’s contributions in the order in
which she raises them in The Missing American Jury. First, she explains that
the Framers empowered the jury with significant authority in order to check
the traditional actors, making it an integral part of the federal structure—
essentially a “branch.” Next, she explains that the judiciary’s failure to treat
the jury with institutional respect, combined with the jury’s unique charac-
teristics, has allowed the traditional actors to free themselves from the jury’s
restraints. Finally, she proposes a doctrinal approach called “relational
originalism” to help reestablish the balance of power.
A. Juries as a “Branch”
The Founders deeply valued juries. The Declaration of Independence is
explicit that King George’s acts “depriving [the colonists], in many Cases, of
the Benefits of Trial by Jury” motivated the revolution.14 And while the Con-
stitution and Bill of Rights do not speak so plainly, the importance of guar-
anteed jury trials played an equally central role in shaping those
14. The Declaration of Independence para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
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documents.15 Fierce debate accompanied initial drafts of the Constitution,
with several delegates refusing to sign because it lacked jury protections be-
yond those for crimes.16 As William Nelson observed, “For Americans after
the Revolution, as well as before, the right to trial by jury was probably the
most valued of all civil rights.”17
Professor Thomas argues that the Founders so valued juries for the same
reason they valued separate bodies exercising government authority: inde-
pendent yet interrelated bodies most effectively balance and check power
(pp. 58–62). The virtues of divided authority are extolled throughout the
Founders’ writings,18 and the Constitution itself is framed as a delineation of
relationships among departments and between federal and state govern-
ments. Professor Thomas contends that “[t]he Founders and the ratifiers . . .
understood that the American jury had an independent role like the execu-
tive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the states—specifically to protect
against actions by them” (p. 62). She then carefully explains the way the
Founders viewed juries in relation to the traditional branches.
First, juries were considered a check on judicial power (p. 62). The
Founders were wary of judges and particularly concerned with the potential
for corruption and state bias (pp. 63–64). Thomas Jefferson emphasized 
this, privileging “the opinion of twelve honest jurymen” over permanent
judges, who “are liable to be tempted by bribery [and] misled by favor, by
relationship, by a spirit of party, [and] by a devotion to the executive or
legislative power.”19 Alexander Hamilton went further to articulate the bene-
fits of the two bodies’ interrelation (p. 64). He called a judiciary made up of
both judges and juries “a double security . . . [that] tends to preserve the
purity of both institutions.”20 “By increasing the obstacles to success,” he
argued, “it discourages attempts to seduce the integrity of either.”21
The Founders also used juries to cabin legislative power (p. 64). The
writings of Hamilton and Monroe reveal that they viewed the constitution-
ally established jury trial as an abridgement of legislative prerogative (pp.
64–66). The Founders ensured that the legislature held no power over the 
jury beyond those expressly stated in the text of the Constitution, so the
15. See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 289, 295 (1966) (“[The] lack of any bill of rights was a principal part of the Anti-
Federalist argument [against ratification]; the lack of provision for civil juries was a prominent 
part of this argument.”).
16. See id. Five of the six states that proposed amendments included two or more jury-
related proposals. See Amar, supra note 7, at 83.
17. William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law 96 (Stanley N. Katz
ed., 1975).
18. See generally The Federalist No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 45–48, 51 (James
Madison).
19. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to L’Abbe Arnoud (1789), in Democracy 95, 96
(Saul K. Padover ed., 1939) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
20. The Federalist, supra note 18, No. 83, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton).
21. Id.
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legislature could not destroy or manipulate the institution.22 Furthermore,
the Founders celebrated the jury as a mechanism to repeal legislation
through nullification, as had happened famously in the John Peter Zenger
trial and frequently in the run up to the American Revolution (pp. 65–66).
Indeed, juries ensured that no legislative act could be en-forced without a 
democratic body of laymen.
Finally, the Founders trusted juries to curtail executive authority (p. 66).
Criminal juries accomplished this through their fact- and law-finding pow-
ers.23 And civil juries ensured that those harmed by executive abuses might
find relief.24 But the most critical way that executive power is limited is
through the promise of grand juries, which can halt the executive from
bringing criminal charges.25 James Wilson espoused the benefits of the grand
jury, writing: “In the annals of the world, there cannot be found an institu-
tion so well fitted for avoiding abuses, which might otherwise arise from
malice, from rigour, from negligence, or from partiality, in the prosecution
of crimes.”26
Professor Thomas concludes that “the constitutional text reveals that the
executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the states, the criminal jury, the civil
jury, and the grand jury all have powers and limitations as well as interde-
pendences” (p. 56). She argues that because of this constitutional role, the
jury is essentially a governmental branch: an institutional body retaining its
own authority while balancing power between the others.27 But despite the
similarities between the jury and the traditional branches, the Supreme
Court has not established an authoritative role for criminal, civil, or grand
juries (p. 56).
B. The Fall of Juries
Professor Thomas draws upon this branch analogy to explain the jury’s
decline. She argues that while the Supreme Court has developed doctrines
“acknowledg[ing] that the traditional actors possess significant authority
and are restrained by important limitations,” the jury has not received simi-
lar attention (p. 90). This failure to doctrinally cement the jury’s constitu-
tional authority has allowed the traditional actors to shift power to their
benefit (p. 90). And because of the jury’s unique institutional characteristics,
it has been unable to combat these usurpations (pp. 91–93).
When confronting questions of competing branch authority, courts
start by recognizing that the traditional branches hold power either external
22. Id. (noting that by establishing criminal juries, the legislature’s “discretion . . . [was]
abridged”); 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 217–18 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1937) (1836)
(James Monroe making a similar point regarding civil juries).
23. See Amar, supra note 7, at 100–01.
24. See id. at 74.
25. See p. 66.
26. 2 James Wilson, Collected Works of James Wilson 992 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., 2007).
27. See p. 68.
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to (in the case of the states) or derived from the Constitution.28 Judges devel-
oped the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers in order to main-
tain these spheres of authority (pp. 70–72). Likewise, the traditional actors
may follow doctrines of self-restraint to maintain interbranch harmony; for
instance, the political question doctrine and case and controversy require-
ments prevent the judiciary from addressing certain issues (p. 73). Despite
these sophisticated approaches, the Court has not developed similar meth-
ods for addressing the jury’s competing authority (p. 75). This failure, Pro-
fessor Thomas argues, has resulted in a piecemeal methodology that has
allowed the traditional actors to “subjugate[ ] the jury while recognizing sig-
nificant power in each other” (pp. 69, 75–76).
Consider the fate of criminal juries: in the 1898 case of Thompson v.
Utah, the Supreme Court determined that a judge could not try a criminal
case without a jury.29 The Court cited the Constitution’s command that
“[t]he trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury,” along with William Black-
stone’s common law recognition that “[t]he public has an interest in [the
defendant’s] life and liberty.”30 Note that while the ruling was textually and
historically sound, it was unsupported by a specific doctrine of the jury’s
constitutional authority. Without that grounding, the Court easily switched
course just thirty years later in Patton v. United States.31 There, the Court
determined that judges did have authority to try defendants because of Con-
gress’s creation of the district courts.32
As Professor Thomas elucidates, in deciding Patton the Court acted
much differently from how it acts with respect to the traditional actors
(p. 79). In this instance, although the Constitution explicitly delineates be-
tween which cases and responsibilities are reserved for the jury and which
are reserved for the judge, the Court ignored this text (p. 79). Likewise, the
Court failed to consider the way that judicial sentencing frustrates the jury’s
institutional responsibility to check the traditional branches for abuses of
power and government overreach (p. 79). Instead, “the Court took power
from the jury and placed it in its own hands” (p. 79).
Similar usurpations occurred to the civil and grand juries over the
course of the twentieth century. With civil juries, the judiciary has claimed
the power to reexamine unreasonable jury findings as well as dismiss cases
that it alone determines lack sufficient evidence.33 It has allowed the execu-
tive to establish agencies with jury-less tribunals34 and the legislature to pass
28. P. 69. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404 (1819).
29. 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
30. Thompson, 170 U.S. at 346, 354 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2).
31. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
32. Patton, 281 U.S. at 299.
33. P. 82; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 (judgment as a matter of law); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56
(summary judgment).
34. See Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common Law”, 71 Ohio
St. L.J. 1071, 1078–1108 (2010) (discussing the creation of new jury-less tribunals for the
determination of fact).
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laws limiting damages.35 Likewise, the grand jury—which like the criminal
jury was once a necessary barrier to curtail executive abuses of power—has
been recategorized as a criminal defendant’s waivable right.36 Moreover, civil
and grand jury rights are among the few liberties not incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 Consequently, many of the exclusive powers that
once defined the jury’s authority have dispersed to the traditional actors.38
Professor Thomas argues that the jury’s institutional traits make it vul-
nerable to these attacks (p. 91). Unlike the traditional actors who can unilat-
erally exercise power by enacting laws or commanding the military, “the jury
cannot sit or otherwise perform without the action of the judiciary” (pp.
91–92). And because of the jury’s position within the judiciary, judicial re-
view of jury authority often involves judges reviewing their own competing
authority (p. 92). This means that “if the judiciary resolves a question of
jury authority favorably toward the jury, the judiciary denies itself power”
(p. 92). Moreover, the jury cannot counter impingements on its authority
like the traditional branches can (p. 92). By stressing their interrelationships,
traditional actors can limit others’ acts or their own acts in order to assert
authority or ensure institutional harmony (pp. 92–93). These characteristics
leave the jury at the whims of the other branches (p. 93).
C. Restoring the Jury’s Authority
Professor Thomas asserts that “[i]f the jury was prescribed . . . a doc-
trine analogous to separation of powers or federalism, the divisions of au-
thority between the jury and the traditional actors could be better assured”
(p. 91). She proposes a method of interbranch deferment that she calls “rela-
tional originalism” (p. 136). This approach to institutional self-restraint
would safeguard the jury’s constitutional role by halting procedures that un-
dermine its authority (p. 136).
“Relational originalism” uses common law as an interpretive frame for
delineating the jury’s authority in relation to the other branches (p. 136).
Although the Seventh Amendment is the only jury clause to explicitly incor-
porate common law, Professor Thomas contends that it provides guidance
for interpreting the authority of criminal and grand juries (pp. 133–36). She
explains that the Founders’ disparate references to common law in establish-
ing juries relate to the ease or difficulty with which they could express the
35. For an in-depth discussion on legislatively imposed damage caps, see Shaakirrah R.
Sanders, Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil Cases, 25 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 235
(2016).
36. Pp. 84–85; see United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); see also Roger A. Fairfax,
Jr., Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and Useful) Role to Play in Criminal Justice?,
in Grand Jury 2.0: Modern Perspectives on the Grand Jury 57, 67–69 (Roger Anthony
Fairfax, Jr. ed., 2011).
37. For a general discussion on nonincorporation of the jury trial rights, see Suja A.
Thomas, Nonincorporation: The Bill of Rights After McDonald v. Chicago, 88 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 159 (2012).
38. See p. 106.
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authority that the institution would exercise.39 With the Seventh Amend-
ment, the Founders relied on “common law” to instruct on the power that
the judiciary and the civil jury held in relation to one another.40 It provided
an external source of context to define this power arrangement.41
Professor Thomas concludes that because the Founders employed com-
mon law as a restraint on the judiciary in relation to a competing actor—the
jury in civil cases—it is justifiable to use common law to interpret authority
in similar circumstances, such as competing authority among the traditional
actors and the grand and criminal juries (pp. 135–36). She proposes that
“[w]hen the constitutional text is ambiguous or the traditional actor grants
itself power in circumstances in which the jury competes for authority, the
common law could be used to limit the traditional actor’s authority” (p.
136). Because juries are institutionally vulnerable to power grabs, applying
this doctrinal approach would protect them from usurpations by the domi-
nant actors—the executive, legislature, and judiciary (p. 136).
Through this lens, Professor Thomas documents four practices that
would cease under her approach (p. 147): first, “a judge’s power to free a
person whom a jury has found guilty of a crime,” which frustrates the jury’s
authority in sentencing (p. 147); second, the executive’s authority to prose-
cute a crime without a grand jury decision, which halts the jury’s authority
to check prosecutions (p. 147); third, the legislature’s capacity to create jury-
less tribunals, which usurps the jury’s power to determine money damages
and fines (p. 148); and finally, judges’ ability to dismiss a civil case based on
an evidentiary determination, which aggravates the jury’s ability to check
the judiciary.42 None of these existed at common law.43 Rather, they are key
examples of how powers that were once exclusive to the jury have shifted in
the absence of doctrinal rigor (pp. 182–85).
Professor Thomas acknowledges the difficulty with halting these prac-
tices (p. 183). The traditional actors consider them integral to securing in-
terests like institutional efficiency and controlling juror bias (p. 183–84). She
counters that these practices remain not merely for administrative ease or to
ensure due process of law but because power-hungry actors “cling to author-
ity they improperly hold” (p. 183). Without a cohesive doctrine of inter-
branch authority that acknowledges the jury’s competing constitutional role,
39. P. 134; see The Federalist, supra note 18 No. 83, at 501 (Alexander Hamilton)
(discussing the difficulties of drafting a right to trial by jury in civil cases).
40. See, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Rela-
tionship with the Jury, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 959, 991–92 (2010) (noting that since the jury was a
well-established institution predating the Constitution, the Founders “could convey fairly pre-
cise meaning simply by using the words ‘trial by jury’ ”).
41. Id.
42. P. 148. Professor Thomas has written extensively on summary judgment as an un-
constitutional practice. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Still Unconstitu-
tional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1667, 1680 (2008).
43. See chapter 5.
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the traditional actors will continue their seizure.44 Relational originalism
provides a path toward balance (pp. 182–85).
II. Expanding the Search
The Missing American Jury offers a fantastic review of how the jury’s
constitutional authority has diminished in the face of executive, legislative,
and judicial aggrandizement. Yet the discussion is incomplete. Professor
Thomas chooses not to address issues attendant to private procedural order-
ing, such as arbitration and contract procedure, focusing instead on govern-
ment-imposed procedures, or those to which the parties may not willingly
consent (p. 3). In so doing, she discounts the way that private procedural
arrangements have contributed to the civil jury’s decline and how these pro-
cedural arrangements fit within her framework.
A. The Rise of Private Procedure and the Fall of Civil Juries
Nearly two and a half centuries ago, William Blackstone warned of “se-
cret machinations, which may sap and undermine [the jury],” and cau-
tioned that no matter how “convenient these may appear at first . . . delays,
and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all free
nations must pay for their liberty.”45 Although the traditional actors of early
America heeded these words, Blackstone’s wisdom seems to have been lost
to those of the twentieth century. Citing dual concerns of economic effi-
ciency and an expanded concept of contractual autonomy, twentieth-cen-
tury traditional actors have ushered in a system of liberal and privatized civil
procedure.46 In so doing, they have granted powerful social and political
actors a private bypass to the civil jury’s public authority.
English common law going back to at least the seventeenth century re-
fused to give effect to procedural contracts.47 Most famously, Lord Coke de-
clined to order a dispute between merchants to private adjudication in 1609,
explaining that while a merchant was free to contract for private dispute
resolution, “he might countermand it; for a man cannot by his act make
such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which is by the law
or of its own nature countermandable.”48 The original rationale for this rev-
ocability is unclear,49 but by the eighteenth century, English courts cited
44. See pp. 182–84.
45. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *343–44 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1769).
46. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 Va. L. Rev. 723,
737–38 (2011).
47. See H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“[T]he jealousy of the English courts for
their own jurisdiction . . . survived for so lon [sic] a period that the principle became firmly
embedded in the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.”).
48. Vynior’s Case (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 597, 598–99; 8 Co. Rep. 81 b, 82 a (footnotes
omitted).
49. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Con-
trolling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 207, 209
(2004) (reviewing potential rationales behind Lord Coke’s order in Vynior’s Case).
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judicial envy.50 Judges jealously guarded their privileged positions and re-
jected agreements they viewed as impermissibly “ousting courts of their
jurisdiction.”51
American judges inherited this aversion to private procedural contracts,
and they justified their attitude in much the same way.52 In 1874, the Su-
preme Court explained that while a party may choose to submit a dispute to
arbitration or refuse to remove a suit to federal court, he cannot “bind him-
self in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to
forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be
presented.”53 State courts agreed.54 Some courts viewed arbitration clauses as
a “trap for the unwary.”55 And the Massachusetts Supreme Court empha-
sized the public’s interest, noting that “[t]he rules to determine in what
courts . . . actions may be brought are fixed, upon considerations of general
convenience and expediency, by general law,” and may not be disturbed by
“the agreement of parties.”56
This common law approach changed during the twentieth century. The
construction of extensive railroad networks during the early 1900s resulted
in more commerce and subsequent disputes between distant merchants.57
Calls for irrevocable arbitration agreements amplified as advocates sought a
more certain and efficient method of dispute resolution.58 Congress re-
sponded in 1925, passing what would later become the Federal Arbitration
Act, providing that contracts to arbitrate disputes would be enforceable as a
matter of federal law.59 Nine years later, in an attempt to increase efficiency
even further, Congress passed the Rules Enabling Act, delegating rulemaking
authority to the Supreme Court and authorizing the creation of a single,
transsubstantive procedural regime.60 The judiciary quickly approved the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937, abolishing rigid pleading standards
and fusing law and equity.61 With these developments, judicial abhorrence to
new procedural arrangement slackened during the midcentury.62
50. Id. at 210.
51. Kill v. Hollister (1746) 95 Eng. Rep. 532, 532; 1 Wils. K.B. 129, 129 (noting that party
agreements cannot oust courts of their jurisdiction).
52. See David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selec-
tion Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 973, 995 (2008).
53. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874).
54. Cf. Carrington & Castle, supra note 49, at 211–12.
55. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev.
331, 340.
56. Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174, 184 (1856).
57. See Carrington & Castle, supra note 49, at 215.
58. Id.
59. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14
(2012)).
60. See Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072(2012)).
61. Letter of Submittal, 308 U.S. 649 (1937).
62. See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 445 (2011).
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Courts rationalized their new boldness by emphasizing efficiency and
litigants’ freedom of contract.63 The biggest statement came in 1972, when
the Supreme Court held enforceable a forum selection clause in The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.64 The Court rejected the common law notion “that
such clauses are improper because they tend to ‘oust’ a court of jurisdic-
tion,” explaining that this was “hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction.”65
Rather than being divested, “overloaded” courts were simply refraining from
exercising their power in order to give effect to the parties’ contract-backed
expectations.66 While Bremen dealt only with forum selection clauses be-
tween sophisticated businesses, it dawned a new era in which judges readily
accepted most procedural contracts.67 Indeed, “ancient concepts of freedom
of contract” freed litigants to shape adjudication as they saw fit.68
Today, civil litigation proceeds through many diverse channels.69 Nota-
bly, the Supreme Court’s expansive reading of the Federal Arbitration Act
has allowed parties to avoid public dispute resolution altogether.70 Powerful
economic actors have responded by creating a complex system of jury-less
private adjudication.71 Contracts, even between parties of disparate sophisti-
cation, so often contain arbitration clauses that some have called this private
system the “new litigation.”72 These agreements are often enforceable even
against typical contract defenses such as fraud,73 illegality,74 and unconscio-
nability.75 In such instances, civil juries adjudicate neither contract validity
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964) (acknowledg-
ing it had become settled law that parties may freely enter into an array of procedural
agreements).
64. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
65. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 52, at 1042 (“The era of contract procedure arguably
dawned with forum selection clauses.”).
68. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11.
69. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 593, 609
(2005).
70. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (noting that the FAA embodies a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”); see also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985) (holding
that the FAA governs statutory claims); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984)
(holding that the FAA preempts state law).
71. See Horton, supra note 62, at 456.
72. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1,
8.
73. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
74. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445 (2006).
75. See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 71 (2010).
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nor the underlying dispute. Substantive issues of law are therefore deter-
mined and developed entirely without the jury’s democratic input, and
courthouses stagnate as places of communitarian law development.76
In addition, today’s courts are routinely entertaining contracts that ma-
nipulate the procedural contours of public dispute resolution. This new form
of organizing civil procedure according to private contracts has been called
“contract procedure.”77 These agreements go far beyond those authorized by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which already allow parties to under-
mine jury authority by consenting to trial by fewer than twelve people or
judgment by non-unanimous verdict.78 Instead, contract procedure sees pri-
vate actors creating their own procedural rules in place of the government,
“[such that] rather than marching in lockstep, cases follow their own ‘mini-
codes of civil procedure.’ ”79 As a result, “[public] civil procedure has taken a
backseat to contract,”80 and an adjudicative framework based on party con-
sent, rather than administrative due process, has become “the preferable
modality for conflict resolution.”81
There is little case law on contract procedure and no clear legislative or
judicial direction on how to cabin litigants’ procedural autonomy.82 Proce-
dures undermining the jury’s authority therefore go unchecked. For in-
stance, parties might consent to award-modification agreements in which
the parties secretly agree on ways to alter the jury’s award, such as cutting
damages by a given percentage or setting damage caps and floors.83 With
these agreements in place, instead of determining the real value of the dis-
pute, the jury acts merely to trigger a clause in the parties’ contingent con-
tract.84 Procedural agreements like these slip past judges because they are
76. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002
J. Disp. Resol. 81, 98 (“[W]e run the risk of finding ourselves without an institution that has
the political legitimacy to make fact- and law-based decisions . . . .”).
77. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1101,
1140 (2006).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48.
79. David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. Rev. 605, 607 (2010).
80. David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Conflu-
ence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 1085, 1113 (2002).
81. Resnik, supra note 77, at 1140.
82. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party
Choice, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1329, 1337–38, 1351 (2012).
83. See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 59, 85 (2016) (reviewing examples of what the authors call “partial settlement
agreements”).
84. See Richard Lorren Jolly, Note, Between the Ceiling and the Floor: Making the Case for
Required Disclosure of High-Low Agreements to Juries, 48 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 813, 824
(2015) (arguing that secret agreements undermine the integrity of the jury).
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considered partial settlements, which ordinarily do not require judicial re-
view.85 Without that backstop, the civil jury is at the whims of private
parties.
B. Private Procedure in the Broader Dialogue
The emergence of binding arbitration and private procedural ordering
mirrors those usurpations of jury authority outlined in The Missing Ameri-
can Jury. Just as criminal procedural modifications like the emergence of
bench trials and plea deals have contributed to the decline of the criminal
and grand jury (pp. 78–79), so too has the civil jury fallen to parties’ new
arrangements. Although private civil procedure does not mark a usurpation
of jury authority by a competing traditional actor per se (p. 69), the tradi-
tional actors benefit from the resulting increased efficiency and decreased
public scrutiny.86 And perhaps most significantly, courts came to accept pri-
vate procedural ordering at the same time that they were approving other
usurpations of the jury’s authority.
Professor Thomas excludes issues of private civil procedure because she
claims that civil litigants freely agree to their modifications, whereas the ex-
ecutive coerces criminal defendants into foregoing their grand and criminal
jury rights.87 It is unclear, however, whether this supposed distinction in
party autonomy and government imposition exists, or why it should be a
noteworthy differentiator. To be sure, the literature on criminal settlement is
far from unanimous in its condemnation of charge and sentence bargaining
as an executive bypass to jury authority.88 Many authors treat these agree-
ments as freely bargained contracts in which criminal defendants and prose-
cutors exchange valuable resources.89 Likewise, although courts generally
accept it to be true, it is not widely agreed that civil litigants enter into
procedural arrangements knowingly and freely.90 Thus, a difference in the
level of party autonomy or whether the practice is government imposed
does not warrant overlooking private procedure.
85. Compare Barton v. Dep’t of Transp., 308 P.3d 597, 608 (Wash. 2013) (describing
high-low agreements as a “partial settlement agreement”), with Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial
Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Economic Analysis, 28 J. Legal Stud. 55, 55
(1999) (noting that courts defer to parties’ settlements except in limited circumstances).
86. See pp. 81–83.
87. See p. 3.
88. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. Legal
Stud. 289, 289 (1983) (contending that plea bargaining is part of a “well-functioning market
system”); Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 943, 947 (2007) (arguing that the current plea bargaining model
creates a system “based upon self incrimination by the defendant”).
89. See Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice”, 13 Law & Soc’y Rev.
509, 516 (1979).
90. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637, 675–80 (1996) (arguing that
clauses are often slipped into contracts of adhesion).
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Perhaps Professor Thomas excludes private procedure from her analysis
because it does not involve the direct aggrandizement of a traditional actor
over the jury, as she says occurs in criminal settlement (p. 79). This too is a
flawed rationale. It is only partially true that allowing criminal defendants to
quickly settle their disputes expands the executive’s actual authority; more
accurately, it acknowledges a new contractual right that defendants did not
enjoy at common law.91 As such, it is not dissimilar to the court’s twentieth-
century recognition of private parties’ right to contract around public adju-
dication.92 Critically, both criminal and civil settlement allow private actors
to replace public institutions by agreement. The judiciary has hurried the
grand, criminal, and civil jury’s decline by privileging private autonomy over
institutional supremacy.
The judiciary has abandoned claims of institutional supremacy not just
out of an expanded notion of contractual autonomy but also for purported
efficiency gains. As many have noted, private civil and criminal procedural
modifications are part of an overall “efficiency norm” that informs the judi-
ciary’s approach to structuring litigation and procedure.93 By allowing par-
ties to channel their disputes to external forums in the case of arbitration
and to use only those public resources they desire in the case of civil and
criminal private procedural ordering, resource-starved courts are able to
handle heavy caseloads. Courts have explicitly approved of these new proce-
dures for their ability to help manage dockets.94
But it is not only the judiciary that privileges efficiency over the jury’s
competing authority. Just as the legislature has constructed a non-trial crim-
inal justice system in order to extract efficiency gains—for instance, by pass-
ing harsh sentencing guidelines that anticipate heavy discounts attendant to
plea deals—so too have they encouraged a non-trial civil justice system.95
This is best evidenced by the Federal Arbitration Act, but also through pub-
lic funding of court-sponsored arbitration programs.96 More than four hun-
dred federal employees work full-time on these arbitration programs with a
dedicated annual budget of over $36,000,000.97 In addition, the legislature
91. See 1 Blackstone, supra note 45, at *129 (“This natural life . . . cannot legally be
disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself nor by any other of
his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.”).
92. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983) (recognizing a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration”).
93. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100
Va. L. Rev. 183, 207–10 (2014) (discussing criminal procedure); Brooke D. Coleman, The
Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1777, 1779 (2015) (discussing civil procedure).
94. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”).
95. See, e.g., Gross & Syverud, supra note 11, at 2–3 (“We prefer settlements and have
designed a system of civil justice that embodies and expresses that preference . . . .”).
96. See Resnik, supra note 69, at 609.
97. Id. (citing Jeffrey M. Senger, Federal Dispute Resolution: Using ADR with
the United States Government 2 (2004)).
April 2018] Expanding the Search for America’s Missing Jury 939
has also slipped pro-settlement policies into other bodies of law, including
tax and bankruptcy.98 Chasing efficiency, the legislature has built a civil jus-
tice system that not only permits but actively encourages parties to avoid
juries.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the emergence of private procedure oc-
curred in lockstep with those usurpations outlined in The Missing American
Jury. As Professor Thomas documents, legislative acts and judicial decisions
disempowering juries clustered in the 1930s, 1940s, and then the 1970s
through today (pp. 94–95). During these periods, radical antijury sentiment
ran high among elites, who successfully influenced the Supreme Court and
shaped public opinion.99 The shift toward enforceable private procedure hits
each of these timeline beats, mirroring the traditional actors’ overarching
march toward disempowering juries and empowering themselves.100 That the
traditional actors do not actually expand their own authority by allowing
private parties to bypass the jury matters not, as they directly benefit from
the attendant efficiency gains and decreased public scrutiny.101 Without the
jury’s watchful eye, the traditional actors are free to distort substantive law
in favor of the powerful and preferred completely unchecked. Just as these
actors cling to power they have unrightfully seized from the jury (pp.
136–37), they relish in consensual inconspicuity.
III. Restoring the Jury
The traditional actors have permitted private distortions of the civil jury
because they lack a doctrinal approach for assessing the jury’s competing
constitutional authority. Professor Thomas’s proposal of “relational
originalism” can fill this gap. It would prohibit private procedural agree-
ments that manipulate the role of the civil jury as it existed at common law
and thus halt certain practices that currently undermine the civil jury’s con-
stitutional position.
A. Private Procedure Through “Relational Originalism”
The Seventh Amendment seems to command an originalist interpreta-
tion.102 By requiring that, “[i]n [s]uits at common law . . . the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved,” it sets a historical reference point carrying some
fixed content.103 Although scholars debate which aspects of the jury must
98. Id.
99. For instance, in 1928 former United States Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans
Hughes urged “[getting] rid of jury trials as much as possible” and called “the judge, the best
servant in our democracy.” Fewer Jury Trials Urged by Hughes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1928, at 3.
100. Compare supra Section I.B, with supra Section II.A.
101. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
102. See pp. 111–12.
103. See pp. 111–12 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VII). But see Amar,
supra note 7, at 89–90 (arguing that “common law” was meant to evolve according to develop-
ments in state and federal common and statutory law).
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remain, most agree that the Seventh Amendment demands some structural
form and function that the Founders called “trial by jury.”104 Moreover, un-
like Article III, Section 2’s criminal jury or the Fifth Amendment’s grand
jury, the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury is framed as an individual “right,”
such that litigants can waive the liberty. Considering these structural- and
rights-based readings together complicates the Seventh Amendment’s dic-
tates on private civil procedure. It is simultaneously unclear which aspects
the traditional actors are unable to disturb and which are open to private
manipulation.
Currently, there is little judicial guidance on how to balance these com-
peting readings when they are in tension.105 As a result, it remains unclear
the extent to which courts will or should “permit [civil] parties to comman-
deer judicial officers.”106 It is axiomatic, of course, that parties may not agree
to procedures that expand jurisdiction, such as waiving the amount in con-
troversy.107 Parties also may not adopt procedures that contradict the court’s
structural form, such as contracting for a three-judge district tribunal or a
particular judge.108 Outside of these Article III constraints, however, courts
have provided little direction on how to limit litigants’ procedural autonomy
in the civil jury context.109
There is some suggestion that the judiciary is antagonistic to private
agreements tasking judges with adjudicative tasks wholly outside of their
institutional form and function.110 Judge Alex Kozinski has colorfully stated
that a party cannot by contract command a judge to rule “by flipping a coin
or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”111 Such provisions are contrary to
the concept of ordered justice and depart from any construct of the judicial
role. But whether this restriction on procedural contracts extends to those
agreements distorting the form and function of the jury is less clear. Might
civil litigants agree to trial by a single juror armed with nothing but a quar-
ter and a dismembered bird? Why not?
104. See Larsen, supra note 40, at 961–63 (“Not even the purest originalist would likely
claim that all attributes of the jury trial were fixed in the last eighteenth century . . . .”).
105. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 46, at 737–38; Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 80, at 1113–14
(2002).
106. See Dodge, supra note 46, at 737–38 (discussing judges, not jurors).
107. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, §§ 1–2; Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514
(2006) (stating that one cannot forfeit or waive subject-matter jurisdiction).
108. Dodge, supra note 46, at 765–66.
109. In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has noted that certain procedural inter-
ests might prevent contracts that have the potential to “irreparably ‘discredit[ ] the federal
courts.’ ” United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (quoting 21 Charles Alan
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5039 (1997))
(discussing the potential procedural importance of some evidentiary provisions).
110. See LaPine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski,
J., concurring) (“The review to which the parties have agreed is no different from that per-
formed by the district courts in appeals from [other tribunals].”).
111. Id.
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Professor Thomas’s relational originalism offers a fresh lens. Under her
approach, the judiciary would refrain from enforcing private contracts that
request procedures altering the jury’s institutional authority in ways beyond
those that existed at common law.112 That is, if the Seventh Amendment
prohibits the government from imposing upon the jury in certain ways, then
the court should not permit private parties to do so either. A private agree-
ment should not make the judiciary exercise its authority in a manner that
undermines the coequal branch of the jury.113 The Constitution entitles liti-
gants to “trial by jury,” not an orchestrated pretense by a public adjudicative
body of their private liking.
Consider the applicability of this approach in a settled context. The
Fourteenth Amendment prevents courts from enforcing private agreements
for an all-white jury in civil cases.114 A relational originalist approach to civil
jury authority would command similarly. The court would review the con-
tract in relation to the jury’s competing institutional authority according to
common law. It would employ an originalist lens to determine whether the
discriminatory contract countermanded the requisite form and function of
what constituted a jury in 1791. Racially discriminatory contracts under-
mine the jury’s authority by altering its form as a democratic body in ways
contrary to those that existed at common law.115 Ultimately, the Court
would hesitate to use its authority to enforce an agreement distorting the
civil jury so.
There are other procedures that, while currently permitted, no less ma-
nipulate away the jury’s authority. Consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
48, which specifically allows parties to consent to trial by fewer than twelve
persons and judgment on a non-unanimous verdict.116 Neither of these
112. See supra Section I.C.
113. Cf. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 620 (1991) (“Although the
conduct of private parties lies beyond the Constitution’s scope in most instances, governmen-
tal authority may dominate an activity to such an extent that its participants must be deemed
to act with the authority of the government and, as a result, be subject to constitutional
constraints.”).
114. See id. at 628.
115. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition of trial by
jury . . . necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the
community.”).
116. Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(b).
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practices existed at common law.117 Empirical studies show that “progres-
sively smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation”118
and that non-unanimous verdicts allow majorities to quickly silence minori-
ties.119 A relational originalist approach would consider these effects, asking
whether competing actors—in this case the Rules Committee and the par-
ties—may alter the jury’s form in a way that burdens its constitutional au-
thority. Because the court would likely find that lack of full and democratic
deliberation diminishes the jury’s ability to check the traditional actors, it
would not permit the practice.120
Relational originalism can address idiosyncratic forms of contract 
procedure, too. Consider again award-modification agreements that allow 
parties to request a damage award from the jury before altering it according
to a contractual prearrangement.121 Because parties often disclose these 
agreements to judges but do not need to disclose them to juries, the 
court is implicit in tasking the jury with performing a function alien to 
the institution: resolving a nonexistent dispute.122 To be sure, the jury is 
asked to determine what the hypothetical value of the dispute would be if 
it were not in fact constrained by the parties’ agreement.123 The court, 
knowing that the verdict will remain unimplemented, allows the parties 
to secretly leverage the jury’s constitutional authority. Aberrations like 
these would be rejected if courts considered the jury’s competing 
constitutional authority to determine actual damages.124 The jury is a 
principal judicial player with a limited and constitutionally codified 
authority; it is not an infinitely malleable institution.
117. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899) (acknowledging that “trial by
jury” meant “trial by a jury of twelve”); Am. Publ’g Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897)
(holding “unanimity was one of the peculiar and essential features of trial by jury at the
common law” and that no authority was necessary for this holding). However, as part of a
general trend disempowering juries during the 1970s, the Supreme Court reversed course on
these issues, describing these holdings as dicta and concluding that the Seventh Amendment
preserved “the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury.” See, e.g., Colgrove v.
Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1973).
118. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232 (1978) (prohibiting criminal juries of fewer than
six people).
119. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of
the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 201, 205 (2006).
120. Imagine that the parties contract for a five-person jury. The Supreme Court has
suggested that a civil jury of fewer than six does not comport with Constitution’s commands
of due process. See Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 159–60, 160 n.16. Would a rights-based reading of the
Seventh Amendment authorize the court to empanel an otherwise too small of a jury? This
new approach would answer “No.”
121. Prescott & Spier, supra note 83, at 85.
122. Jolly, supra note 84, at 828.
123. Id. at 824–26.
124. Cf. Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 2381, 2382,
2401 (1999) (stressing an understanding of the jury as a “responsibility-taking institution”).
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It is important to stress that application of Professor Thomas’s doctrinal
approach to private civil procedure would spell the end of neither arbitra-
tion nor contract procedure. It also would not alter the notion that the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are defaults around which the parties may
contract.125 The Seventh Amendment did not freeze civil procedure or con-
tract law in 1791, and relational originalism does not suggest otherwise. Pri-
vate parties would remain free to enter into procedural arrangements to
make trial by jury quicker, cheaper, and more accurate. What is prohibited
under this approach, however, is the commandeering of the civil jury in
ways that manipulate its form and function to undermine its competing
constitutional authority.
Conclusion
Incorporating private procedural ordering into the framework Professor 
Thomas presents in The Missing American Jury would create an even more 
comprehensive work. Her contributions offer a structure for cogently ad-
dressing understudied questions regarding private distortions of the jury 
and the civil justice system generally. Yet shortcomings remain. This ap-
proach does little to retort the efficiency interests that the traditional actors 
claim are near supreme. Nor does it address the multitude of reasons why 
private parties have so readily jettisoned their right to a civil jury. But those 
problems are symptoms of a more serious ailment. Resuscitating the jury will 
require more than a doctrinal framework; it will require us to confront the 
collapse in esteem for the community's collective widsom.
125. Stephen C. Yeazell & Joanna C. Schwartz, Civil Procedure 159 (9th ed. 2016)
(noting “the extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules”).
